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Woodrow Wilson’s Place in Political Time:  
A Critique of Stephen Skowronek’s The Politics Presidents Make 
INTRODUCTION: SKOWRONEK, PREEMPTION, AND WOODROW WILSON 
 In Stephen Skowronek’s The Politics Presidents Make, Skowronek divides all past U.S. 
presidents into one of four categories in his typology. He spends his entire discussion on three of 
these categories: the reconstructives, who attempt to repudiate the past to establish a new party 
regime, the articulators, who act as the faithful sons and continue the commitments of the 
reconstructives, and the disjunctives, who struggle with the impossible leadership situation to 
revive the dying regime. The preemptives, those who come into power opposed to a resilient 
regime, are hardly discussed in his entire analysis. Skowronek defines these presidents as “the 
wild cards of presidential history,” given that they do not fit in his recurrent pattern of 
foundation, consolidation, fragmentation, and decay.1 He claims that the preemptives do not 
“establish, uphold, or salvage” like the other three groups, but instead, offer a third way, or an 
alternative.2 This classification, as well as his lack of discussion on the preemptives, makes it 
seem as though there is no place for the preemptive presidents in his typology. Skowronek not 
only seems to disregard their significance, but also does not consider long-term effects of 
opposition presidents. He effectively isolates and removes the “wild card” preemptives of his 
own creation completely from political time. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Stephen Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to Bill Clinton (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1997), 444.  
2 Ibid., 449.	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 Woodrow Wilson is one president who Skowronek defines as making the politics of 
preemption. Wilson does not fit comfortably into Skowronek’s typology, as no other president 
before or after Wilson had to face the same challenge as he did upon taking office in 1912.While 
Skowronek labeled him as a preemptive president in Lincoln’s Republican regime, Wilson’s role 
is much more complicated than that, and his contributions were much more significant than 
Skowronek’s analysis suggests. Wilson was not a “wild card,” and was not irrelevant in the 
course of presidential history. On the contrary, his presidency dramatically changed the emergent 
pattern of presidential power, the place of the Republican Party in the recurrent pattern of 
Lincoln’s regime, and laid the foundations for the future of the Democratic Party. An 
examination of Woodrow Wilson proves not only that Skowronek’s treatment of the preemptives 
is lacking, but also reveals weaknesses in Skowronek’s method of analysis and framework 
overall.  
 A part of the reason that Wilson does not fit into his framework is that Skowronek is 
limited by his definition of party regimes as he fails to consider the significance of smaller 
movements within the larger context of a period of party dominance. Skowronek places Wilson 
in the middle of Abraham Lincoln’s Republican regime established in 1860, which constrains 
Skowronek’s ability to understand Wilson in the context of his own time. Not only was Wilson 
opposed to the still resilient regime of his predecessors William Howard Taft and Theodore 
Roosevelt, but he also needed to approach his presidency within the context of the Progressive 
Era. Considering these factors is something Skowronek fails to do, as he emphasizes the larger 
sweeping party regimes while discounting the smaller political movements within said regimes. 
His division of presidential history into large party regimes misses the significance of smaller 
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movements such as the Progressive Era, and the ways in which these different time periods 
influenced the emergent patterns of presidential politics. 
 Lastly, Skowronek does not divide his analysis of presidents between foreign and 
domestic policies. In fact, he spends very little time talking about foreign affairs at all. In 
Wilson’s case, it is necessary to divide analysis of his presidency between his domestic and 
foreign politics, as he faced different challenges in each area. Wilson had to justify his domestic 
reform program, New Freedom, in the context of the expansion of presidential power in the 
Progressive Era while simultaneously attempting a reconstruction of foreign affairs in the time of 
a World War against stark Republican opposition. Here is another area in which Skowronek does 
not take his analysis far enough. Had he divided up his discussion of individual presidents 
between their domestic and foreign politics, he would have realized that presidents make 
different politics in both situations. Herein lies the possibility that one president can occupy more 
than one space in political time, and fit in more than one section of Skowronek’s typology. 
 Analyzing the presidency of Woodrow Wilson through Skowronek’s framework 
illustrates that Skowronek’s typology is insufficient for fully explaining and understanding 
Wilson’s place in political time. Woodrow Wilson should not be viewed as a preemptive 
president in the context of Lincoln’s Republican regime, but as a Democrat in the Progressive 
Era. Doing so reveals that Wilson was articulating the domestic policy platform of his 
Republican Progressive predecessors. However, by separating analysis of domestic and foreign 
policy, it becomes clear that Wilson was breaking from the past and attempting a reconstruction 
of U.S. foreign policy. Furthermore, it is Wilson’s legacy and long-term significance which 
outlasted any immediate failures from being an opposition president, allowing him to transcend 
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Skowronek’s classification of a president making the politics of preemption to a more complex 
role in presidential history. 
THE GILDED AGE AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 
 In order to understand Wilson’s place in political time, the context of his rise to power 
must be examined, beginning with the era preceding the Progressives. The era before Wilson’s 
has been colloquially called the Gilded Age, and was marked by laissez-faire presidential 
leadership with corrupt monopolies ruling the business world unchecked. The presidents who 
served during this time, Rutherford B. Hayes, James A. Garfield, Chester A. Arthur, Benjamin 
Harrison, and Grover Cleveland are often remembered through history as the “forgotten 
presidents,” since they rarely exercised their powers in office. Instead, they let monopolies form 
as businesses gained political power. This era was a time of corruption, patronage, societal 
divisions, high wealth inequality, and weak leadership following the post-Civil War 
reconstruction era.  
 Furthermore, this was an era of Republican dominance. Four of the five presidents during 
this period were Republican, and both houses of Congress had a Republican majority almost the 
whole era. The only Democratic president during this period, Grover Cleveland, could not 
overcome the systemic factors of his time. Cleveland failed to obtain mastery over his party 
necessary for a reconstruction, and even divided his party over the repeal of the Silver Purchase 
Act.3 In addition, Cleveland’s administration was blamed for the Panic of 1893, when shaky 
railroad financing led to bank failures and intensified the debate over the gold standard. Yet 
Cleveland could not effectively respond to these crises, as historian Vincent De Santis notes, 
since “most Americans regarded government regulation as unnecessary, unjust, and even 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Henry Loomis Nelson and Daniel S. Lamont, “Grover Cleveland,” Politico Vol. 188, No. 633 (August 1908): 182. 
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immoral.”4 This idea suggests that leaders could not overcome the limits of their own era. The 
instability, corruption, patronage, and divisions following the post-war period placed constraints 
on the public’s expectations for the presidency and their capacity to act in the Gilded Age. The 
result was complete governmental inactivity, leading the Democratic Party and Presidency into a 
dire state. 
 The election of 1896 resulted in a victory for Republican William McKinley who by 
Skowronek’s conception of a party regime was still a part of Lincoln’s Republican Party system. 
However, the Republican Party McKinley was striving for was much different than the party of 
Lincoln. This election was a close victory for McKinley, who only defeated William Jennings 
Bryan by less than one million votes.5 This victory was not realigning in the conventional sense 
as the previous era was already dominated by Republicans. Instead, 1896 was realigning in the 
sense that it established a new set of commitments and direction that reshaped the Republican 
Party and whole political system. McKinley’s election ushered in the Progressive Era which was 
very much a response to this era of inaction and laissez-faire. The reconstruction he was 
attempting was not an effort to repudiate an opposing party, but an internal repudiation of past 
Republican leaders and politics. What McKinley accomplished was too radical to be considered 
mere articulation.  
 McKinley’s inaugural address reeks of repudiation. It not only condemns Cleveland and 
the situation in America, but it also sets forth a new program for the U.S. domestically, in foreign 
policy, and sets a precedent of party leadership. As far as domestic policy, McKinley mentioned 
the need for banking reform, addressing business conditions, reforming the tariff, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Vincent De Santis, “American Politics in the Gilded Age,” The Review of Politics Vol.25, No. 4 (October 1963): 
554. 
5 “1896,” U.S. Presidential Election Data, The American Presidency Project, 
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/elections.php 
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agricultural reform.6 As far as foreign affairs, McKinley began to pave the way for new activism 
abroad. He remarked, “In this age of frequent interchange and mutual dependence, we cannot 
shirk our international responsibilities.”7 While remaining within the realm of the Western 
hemisphere, McKinley was advocating a more active role on the world stage. Finally, he also 
established the precedent of Progressives as Party leaders. McKinley “saw party organization as 
a dual instrument to enact the people’s will and educate them to meet new ideas. He often 
warned fellow politicians against avoiding new challenges.”8 McKinley recognized the need for 
strong partisan politics.9 He became the master of his party, embraced change, and sought to 
tackle the poor state of America. All three of these areas, domestic policy, foreign activism, and 
party leadership, set the tone for the rest of the Progressive Era and determined the direction of 
his successors.  
 McKinley was reelected in 1900, but was assassinated in 1901, only six months into his 
second term. With his death, Theodore Roosevelt, McKinley’s second term vice president, 
assumed the role of president. T. Roosevelt continued the work of his predecessor, and presented 
the country with a Square Deal. This platform consisted of consumer protection, conservation of 
natural resources, and reining in corporations. As far as foreign policy, T. Roosevelt promoted 
interventionism on the basis of nationalism and asserting the U.S. as a world power. In casting T. 
Roosevelt as an articulator, it is important to consider who he was articulating. It was not so 
much Lincoln from 1860, but McKinley, his immediate predecessor who launched the 
Progressive Era. While his commitments were the same as McKinley’s, it was T. Roosevelt who 
had the charisma and eloquence to truly turn Progressivism into an established movement. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 William McKinley, “First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1897,” 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/mckin1.asp. 
7 H. Wayne Morgan, “William McKinley as a Political Leader,” Review of Politics Vol. 28, No. 4 (Oct. 1966): 427.	  
8 Ibid., 420.  
9 Ibid. 
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 After T. Roosevelt left office in 1908, his Secretary of War William Howard Taft was 
elected. Seeing as he was directly from T. Roosevelt’s administration, Taft can be considered as 
T. Roosevelt’s “hand-picked successor” who followed his path in both domestic and foreign 
affairs. Taft, as the “faithful son” making the politics of articulation, fulfilled his role perfectly. 
Not only did he continue T. Roosevelt’s domestic and international traditions, but he updated 
them to fit the presidency in his own right as the orthodox-innovator. Domestically, in his 
inaugural address Taft discussed all of the same areas that his predecessors, McKinley and T. 
Roosevelt, had dedicated the Republican Progressive coalition. He mentioned business, antitrust 
legislation, agricultural reform, the tariff, conservation efforts, protection of labor, and the 
Panama Canal.10 Taft directly tied himself to T. Roosevelt’s regime when he said, “I should be 
untrue to myself, to my promises, and to the declarations of the party platform upon which I was 
elected to office, if I did not make the maintenance and enforcement of those reforms a most 
important feature of my administration.”11 Considering that he played an active role in T. 
Roosevelt’s administration and the fact that T. Roosevelt’s policies were still in favor, Taft 
understood that it was his duty to honor those commitments. 
 As far as foreign policy, Taft continued the policies of his predecessors by promoting the 
maintenance of a strong army and avoidance of war at all costs. What is of importance is that he 
used the phrase “this hemisphere,” which still affirmed the path of isolationism towards 
European affairs.12 Throughout his administration, Taft promoted a policy of Dollar Diplomacy, 
the idea of promoting U.S. economic interests abroad through intervention.13 However, as his 
administration went on, Taft became more conservative and was not fulfilling his role as the heir 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 William Howard Taft, “Inaugural Address, March 4, 1909,” avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/taft.asp. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Thomas Bruscino, “The Rooseveltian Tradition; Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, and George W. Bush,” 
White House Studies Vol. 10, N. 4 (2011): 311, 313. 
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to Progressivism. This shift led to the ultimate fragmentation of the Republican Party as T. 
Roosevelt felt betrayed and broke with his unfaithful son. The fracturing of the Republican Party 
and disagreement between Republican leaders provided a perfect opening for a Progressive 
Democrat to take the stage. 
 These were the political circumstances upon which Wilson ran for President in 1912. The 
emergent pattern of the Progressive Era consisted of changing expectations of the President and 
more intervention in the economy than ever before. Historian Arthur S. Link defines 
Progressivism as “the popular effort . . . to ensure the survival of democracy in the United States 
by the enlargement of governmental power to control and offset the power of private economic 
groups over the nation’s institutions and life.”14 Furthermore, this era saw the expansion of a 
more aggressive nationalistic foreign policy. But this era was more than expanded government 
regulation. This increase in presidential authority demanded the President to be active, not 
passive, and to exercise more power in office. Progressivism was the redefinition of the 
institution of the presidency grounded upon the repudiation of the laissez-faire tradition of the 
Gilded Age. To understand Wilson’s place in political time, he must be understood as a 
Progressive Democrat. Not a Democrat opposed to a resilient regime of Republicans established 
by Lincoln, but as the first Democratic President coming into power as a part of emerging 
Progressivism. The Progressive Era represented a complete break from the past and an attempt to 
establish a new role for the presidency which transcended party ties. This was the political 
environment in which Woodrow Wilson must be situated. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Arthur S. Link, “What happened to the Progressive Movement in the 1920’s?” The American Historical Review 
Vol. 64, No. 4 (July 1959): 836.	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PATH TO PREEMPTION: ELECTION OF 1912 
 Wilson had to face a unique challenge going into the election of 1912. In order to win the 
nomination, Wilson had to appeal to two different constituencies within the Democratic base. He 
had to appeal to those who favored progressivism or radicalism as well as those who were more 
conservative and still dedicated to the Jeffersonian tradition of weak central government and 
states’ rights.15 However, due to the record of Democratic defeats and continuous Republican 
government, Wilson had the authority to repudiate his own party position. While he still had to 
order-affirm the legacy of Jefferson, he was also able to promote progressive ideals in an effort 
to reshape the commitments of his party. 
 Wilson ended up winning the Democratic nomination for his ability to reconcile both of 
these positions. As far as his competition in 1912, T. Roosevelt decided to run against the 
incumbent Taft for the Republican nomination. Taft ended up winning the nomination, so in 
response T. Roosevelt formed his own Progressive “Bull Moose Party.” This action fractured the 
Republican Party even further, dividing the Republicans into two camps behind the two 
prominent leaders of the era, moving the Republican regime to a state of fragmentation. This 
decision is often viewed as the main factor that contributed to Wilson’s ultimate victory. The 
contest of 1912 saw Wilson faced against both Taft and T. Roosevelt, his fellow Progressives.  
 During the campaign, Wilson was often criticized by his opponents for having backward-
looking conservative commitments. Yet at the same time, Wilson was propounding a progressive 
platform. Some wrote this off as inconsistency, and other historians, such as Arthur S. Link, have 
claimed that Wilson was pressured into a more Progressive stance than he desired.16 It is not so 
much as that Wilson changed his mind to embrace Progressivism as it was the nature of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 John Milton Cooper, Jr., Woodrow Wilson: A Biography (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2009).  
16 Arthur S. Link, Wilson: The New Freedom (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956).	  
Plant 10 
	  
election. Because the election of 1912 pitted T. Roosevelt and Wilson against each other, the two 
men with Progressive ideals both polarized their positions. To distinguish himself from the 
opposition, Wilson had to promote a more conservative platform. But once in office, Wilson 
catered to the more Progressive Democratic constituency. All along he embraced the tide of 
Progressivism and used it as a platform to launch his Democratic reconstruction.  
 Despite the apparent inconsistencies in Wilson’s platform and in light of the Republican 
fragmentation, Wilson won the election with only 41.8% of the popular vote but a crushing 
81.9% of the electoral vote.17  The Congressional results showed promise for a Democratic 
reconstruction as well, as for the first time in decades, both houses of Congress held a 
Democratic majority. The House had already turned Democratic in the previous midterm 
election, but it gained 89 new seats to strengthen its hold on the chamber.18 The Senate followed 
suit by switching to Democratic control.19 This election was evidence of Wilson’s unique 
position in political time. The record of Democratic defeats gave him authority to repudiate the 
position of his party. However, he also had to provide a different option than T. Roosevelt and 
Taft, forcing him to polarize his position during the election to oppose the Republican 
Progressivism. His victory demanded that Wilson attempt to redefine Progressivism in 
Democratic terms while simultaneously continuing the Progressive movement. 
 The fractured state of the Republican Party in 1912 speaks to Wilson’s place in the 
recurrent pattern of both Lincoln’s Republican regime and the Progressive Era. Wilson came into 
power during a relatively weak Republican period, between the fragmentation of T. Roosevelt 
and the decay in the 1920’s seen from Warren G. Harding to Herbert Hoover. Furthermore, his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 “1912,” U.S. Presidential Election Data, The American Presidency Project.  
18 “Congress Profiles: History, Art, & Archives,” United States House of Representatives, 
History.house.gov/Congressional_Overview/Profiles/. 
19 Party Divisions in the Senate,” United States Senate, 
www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/one_item_and_teasers_partydiv.htm.	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Democratic predecessor Cleveland had left the Democratic Party divided and weak. It was 
necessary that Wilson rejuvenate and reorganize the commitments of his party in light of the 
presidency’s newfound Progressivism. Considering his place in the recurrent pattern and the 
Democratic majorities elected to both the House and the Senate in 1912, it seems as though 
Wilson was in the prime position to launch a reconstruction of his own. 
FIRST TERM: DOMESTIC ARTICULATION 
 Wilson spent the majority of his first term articulating the domestic Progressive Era 
platform by tackling the same areas as his Progressive predecessors. During the campaign, 
Wilson had set forth his domestic reform program of New Freedom, which consisted of three 
components: tariff reform, banking and finance reform, and antitrust legislation. All of these 
issues were the very issues the three Progressive presidents before Wilson addressed during their 
administrations. Wilson was continuing their domestic reforms while redefining them in his own 
right to the purposes of the Democratic Party. While he was articulating the Progressive position 
he was also attempting to redefine the Progressive movement in his own terms as a Democrat. 
As a result, he ended up betraying the commitments of his predecessors, and confusing the 
definition and aims of the Progressive movement as a whole. 
 Wilson interpreted his victory and the Democratic victories in Congress as the public’s 
response to the previous administrations. In his inaugural address, he stated, “No one can 
mistake the purpose for which the nation now seeks to use the Democratic Party. It seeks to use 
it to interpret a change in its own plan and point of view.”20 Wilson saw this change as the basis 
of his authority and justification to repudiate the Republican Party and to redefine the 
government in Democratic terms. His address also contains order-shattering impulses, as he said 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Woodrow Wilson, “First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1913,” 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/wilson1.asp. 
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of the past regimes, “Some old things with which we had grown familiar . . . have dropped their 
disguises and showed themselves alien and sinister.”21 Here Wilson was order-shattering and 
attempting to break with the past. He was declaring that it was time to acknowledge the poor 
state of the government and to change it. Wilson believed the Democratic Party was the vehicle 
needed to launch that reconstruction. 
 Wilson’s inaugural address is also full of order-creating reconstructive language. He 
proclaimed, “Our duty is to  cleanse, to reconsider, to restore, to correct the evil without 
impairing the good, to purify and humanize every process of our common life without 
weakening or sentimentalizing it . . . our work is a work of restoration . . . we shall restore, not 
destroy.”22 Here Wilson was embracing reconstructive and order-affirmation language as he 
proclaimed a desire to stay connected to traditions and the parts of government that work while 
searching for new ways to solve problems. Coming into his first term, Wilson appeared as 
though he was prepared to launch a reconstruction of the government. However, he ended up 
mostly articulating the Republican Progressive platform.  
 He then proceeded in his address to lay out the specific order-creating elements of his 
domestic program, New Freedom. The tariff had been an issue struggled with for years, as many 
other presidents tried and failed to lower it. As far as banking reform, there was a consensus that 
change was needed but debate over whether control should be private or public, and centralized 
or decentralized. And lastly, T. Roosevelt and Taft had reputations as “trust-busters,” yet they 
disagreed on how to handle them. T. Roosevelt distinguished between good and bad trusts, and 
sought to reform the conduct of monopolies. But Taft saw that the issue was the legality of the 
trusts, and sought to prevent them from happening. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Woodrow Wilson, “First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1913.”  
22 Ibid.	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 Wilson’s New Freedom dealt with all three of these areas. For the tariff, Wilson’s 
Underwood Tariff successfully destroyed special privileges to increase competition and provided 
relief for consumers, and had a provision for the income tax. Secondly, the Federal Reserve Act 
established one central and twelve regional district banks to create a reserve system. This act 
appeased almost all of the differing groups as it was in part decentralized and centralized, with 
mostly public control. Lastly, the Clayton Antitrust Act aimed to restore competition and came 
down harder on the monopolies without destroying big business. This platform was mostly 
rearticulating the already established commitments of the Progressive Era and the presidents 
before him.23 
 The difference between mere articulation and Wilson’s New Freedom was that Wilson 
used the Democratic Party to achieve his reforms. This technique worked and Wilson was able to 
execute his entire reform program. A part of Wilson’s unprecedented legislative success was that 
he obtained complete mastery of the Democratic Party. One way in which he did this was by 
decreasing the separation between himself and the Congress. He appeared in person to speak 
before Congress, something that had not been done since before Jefferson’s presidency.24 This 
practice allowed Wilson to act as the personal spokesman for his New Freedom program, and to 
present it directly to the members of Congress. Wilson, following the example of British 
Parliament, was attempting to achieve leadership by party.25 Wilson said, “I look upon the party 
as an instrument, not an end.”26 Unfortunately, Wilson negotiated all of his New Freedom 
legislations solely with members of his own party. He made his program a partisan issue and 
conducted his reforms as the leader of the Democratic Party. The result was that Republicans felt 
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left out of the proceedings and were frustrated by Wilson’s exclusion.27 Following McKinley’s 
precedent, Wilson believed employing partisan leadership was the path to success. 
 Another way Wilson led his party was by making use of patronage, an anti-Progressive 
practice, for his appointments. Wilson personally handled his appointments in order to fill his 
government with supporters dedicated to pursuing a Progressive government.28 He made it clear 
early on in his presidency that he wanted his administration to be a Progressive one and he saw 
to it that he was supported by other dedicated Progressives. Wilson was using patronage to 
attempt to redefine party government. Historian Daniel D. Stid claims, “far from seeking to 
destroy the traditional American Party system, Wilson was attempting to transform and thereby 
legitimize it.”29 Wilson attempted to build a party of “individuals [who] would invariably band 
together to pursue ends they had in common.”30 By using patronage, Wilson was taking it upon 
himself to build a party that would pursue Progressive interests. His use of patronage, as well as 
personal relations with Congress, were ways in which Wilson attempted to change the nature of 
party governance and ensure the success of his reconstruction. 
 After surviving the perils of a divided party during the election of 1912, Wilson 
ultimately obtained complete mastery over his party. Through the use of patronage and direct 
interaction with the Democratic members of Congress, Wilson was able to unite his party under 
his cause to pursue his legislative platform. This allowed him to push his agenda through entirely 
in his first term and to achieve the most unprecedented legislative success in history. This 
success allowed Wilson to set himself and the Democratic Party on a solid foundation of 
Progressive reform. Wilson was strengthening his party and solidifying his position of 
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leadership. While he may have only been articulating the Progressive position of his Republican 
predecessors, he was prepping himself up for future success, simultaneously weakening the 
Republican Party even further, and establishing himself as the leader of the Democratic Party. 
REELECTION AND SECOND TERM: FOREIGN RECONSTRUCTION 
 Wilson ran for reelection in 1916 against Republican Charles Evan Hughes on the 
campaign slogan “he kept us out of war,” citing his ability to maintain neutrality towards the 
budding European conflict throughout his first term. He also was able to herald his major 
legislative success through the New Freedom as the rightful leader of the Progressive Democrats. 
The Republicans were still divided, but without the third-party factor dividing the vote, the 
election was much closer. Wilson narrowly won reelection in 1916 with only 49.2% of the 
popular vote and 52.2% of the electoral vote to Hughes’ 46.1% and 47.8% respectively.31 He 
also retained a Democratic majority in both houses of Congress, although the majority decreased 
slightly. Wilson began his term affirming the success of his previous term, as he highlighted in 
his inaugural address, “Perhaps no equal period in our history has been so fruitful of important 
reforms in our economic and industrial life or so full of significant changes in the spirit and 
purpose of our political action.”32 Wilson began his term strong, relying on the legitimacy of his 
past success to propel him forward and hopefully be enough to sustain him through the years to 
come. 
 However, he also acknowledged the growing possibility of impeding foreign 
intervention. Wilson declared, “There can be no turning back. Our own fortunes as a nation are 
involved whether we would have it so or not . . . We shall be the more American if we but 
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remain true to the principles in which we have been bred.”33 Even if the U.S. had maintained 
neutrality in his first term, Wilson knew that the war was becoming a growing threat to the U.S. 
and their allies. While his campaign slogan was “he kept us out of war,” Wilson never did 
promise that he would be able to maintain neutrality. His second inaugural address was an early 
attempt to begin preparing the U.S. for the war to come. Wilson ended up being correct, as not 
long into his second term, he could no longer maintain neutrality and decided to enter the foreign 
conflict. It was in this term and under these circumstances that he was able to launch his 
reconstruction of U.S. foreign policy.  
 Wilson’s reconstruction was based not in domination by his party, but by an effort to 
break with the U.S. tradition of non-interventionism. Wilson was suggesting an unprecedented 
involvement in European affairs with the aim of redirecting America’s role in the world. In his 
“War Message” to Congress, Wilson proclaimed,  
 We shall fight for the things which we have always carried nearest our hearts—for 
 democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own 
 governments, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of 
 right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and 
 make the world itself at last free.34  
 
Wilson linked an unprecedented intervention in a European war to older American traditional 
ideals and values dating back to the American Revolution. Furthermore, he began to set the stage 
for his later crusade for an international organization when he referenced the notion of a “league 
of honour,” and “partnership of democratic nations.” Wilson was attempting to prepare the 
Americans for the possibility of one’s creation in the context of fighting for traditional American 
values. 35 This is the ultimate order-affirmation. 
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 Wilson’s order-affirming impulses were nontraditional. Considering he had no precedent 
to fall back on to justify his repudiation of the past, Wilson called upon the United States’ 
standing in the world as evidence of the part they should play in the post-war world. This 
strategy was effectively order-shattering historical tradition and isolationism towards European 
affairs. What he was attempting to do with his order-creating forces was to establish the U.S. as a 
world power and the leader of an international organization aimed at promoting world peace and 
cooperation between nations. This ideal was central to Wilson’s reconstruction. 
 At the conclusion of the war, Wilson took advantage of the opening he had been looking 
for to promote his new vision for U.S. foreign policy. Wilson traveled to France to take part of 
the peace negotiations armed with his Fourteen Points, clear visions for the terms of the peace 
settlement, as well as the provisions for an international peace-keeping league. He met the rest of 
the Big Four, consisting of David Lloyd George of Britain, Vittorio Orlando of Italy, and 
Georges Clemenceau of France at Versailles. Before the negotiations, he expressed his 
confidence to Herbert Hoover, then a member of his war time cabinet: 
 [Wilson] made some expression of his satisfaction that the Allied leaders so strongly 
 supported his ideals. I commented that he must not ignore the shapes of evil inherent in 
 the Old World system. He brushed this aside with a remark that Europe had a changed 
 spirit as the result of the blood bath through which it had passed. But one day, three 
 months later, Mr. Wilson remarked wearily that I had been right.36 
 
While Hoover was worried that Wilson’s ideals about foreign policy were too revolutionary for 
the European leaders to embrace, Wilson seemed to believe the time was exactly right for such a 
proposal. Unfortunately for Wilson, Hoover was indeed right and Wilson had to concede on 
almost all of his points in Versailles in order to secure the one component he wanted most: the 
League of Nations. All that was left now was to take the Treaty of Versailles back to the United 
States, and go to the Senate for ratification. 
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 This task proved more difficult than anticipated, as Wilson faced much opposition from 
the Senate. In the 1918 Congressional elections, Wilson suffered a blow to his post-war aims. 
Before the elections, he desperately pleaded to the public, “If you have approved of my 
leadership and wish me to continue to be your unembarrassed spokesman in affairs at home and 
abroad, I earnestly beg that you will express yourself unmistakably to that effect by returning a 
Democratic majority to both Senate and House of Representatives.”37 Instead the Senate, which 
previously had a Democratic majority, flipped to Republican control by one vote.38 In turn, the 
House, controlled by Republicans since 1916, increased its hold of the chamber.39 This 
Republican majority was not receptive to Wilson’s plans, and he had a tough fight ahead of him. 
 Following his tradition from the first term, Wilson was not very open to negotiating with 
the Republican Party. The Senate opposition, headed by Henry Cabot Lodge, proposed a set of 
reservations to the treaty which Wilson saw as stripping the League of Nations of its core 
principles and purpose and did not accept. After going on a nationwide speaking tour attempting 
to sway public opinion to put pressure back on the Senate, Wilson suffered a stroke which left 
him paralyzed on his left side. With its main crusader weakened, and public opinion unable to 
sway the Senate, the Treaty of Versailles failed to pass, and the U.S. did not join the League of 
Nations. At the time, it appeared as though Wilson’s foreign reconstruction had failed. 
 One counterargument to the notion of Wilson as the leading reconstruction president of 
U.S. foreign policy in is the fact that the concept of a peace-keeping international organization 
was not an entirely new idea. For one, there was a part of the Republican constituency supporting 
a league even before Wilson began promoting one. For example, former President Taft was 
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elected the president of an organization dedicated to promoting an international organization, the 
League to Enforce Peace. Formed in January 1915, this group based in New York worked to 
advocate their own plans for a peace-keeping league, and later supported the League of 
Nations.40 However, Wilson did not accept their plan. This could be for a couple reasons. For 
one, Wilson may not have wanted to involve himself with the Republican Party, as seen in his 
tradition of Democratic Party leadership. But considering the divided state of the Republican 
Party, and Taft’s association with the LEP, Wilson may have had a better chance had he worked 
with them. More likely, however, is that Wilson wanted to be the one to define the terms. Just as 
Wilson would not accept any reservations, he would not accept a draft for an international 
organization from anyone other than himself. He had to be in control, and he had to design it to 
his specifications or it would not work.  
 In addition to Taft, some of the most prominent Republican leaders now in opposition to 
the League of Nations were discussing such a possibility years before Wilson’s crusade. Both T. 
Roosevelt and Senator Lodge had gone on the record supporting a peace-keeping organization. 
Roosevelt claimed in 1910, “It would be a master stroke if those great Powers honestly bent on 
peace would form a League of Peace, not only to keep the peace among themselves, but to 
prevent, by force if necessary, its being broken by others.”41 Similarly, Lodge said as late as 
1916, “I do not believe that when Washington warned us against entangling alliances he meant 
for one moment that we should not join with the other civilized nations of the world if a method 
could be found to diminish war and encourage peace.”42 So why, then, did these leaders and their 
party work so fervently to stop Wilson and his League? 
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 James M. Cox, the future Democratic candidate for President in 1920, posed his own 
theory. He wrote of T. Roosevelt and Lodge’s apparent switch: 
 They knew that from Jefferson to Lincoln, with but brief interruptions, the Democratic 
 Party had held full sway . . . Such leadership could not but impress and direct the mood 
 of the nation for years to come. Roosevelt and Lodge well knew this. If now there were 
 added to these achievements the establishment of world peace, the supreme event in the 
 history of nations, the name of Wilson and the prestige of his party might be invincible as 
 after Jackson and Jefferson.43 
 
Cox was claiming that Lodge and Roosevelt were acting out of the interests of the future 
prospects of their party. They wanted a Republican victory in 1920, and destroying Wilson’s 
chances at achieving his peace settlement was a path to obtain just that. In addition, as seen in 
Wilson’s presidency thus far, Wilson was establishing a strong Democratic Party government. If 
the Republican’s hoped to compete, they would have to come together and act as a unified body 
ready to oppose Wilson’s party government. This tactic was the emergence of solidified party 
warfare, and an example of placing the party’s interest above the good of the country, and in this 
case, possibly over the whole world, as the League of Nations crumbled without the United 
States’ leadership. 
 Despite the failure of the U.S. to join the League of Nations after WWI and that the 
concept of the U.S. joining an international organization did not originate with Wilson, his 
ideology was still new. While the means he may have promoted may have been the same as 
Taft’s or T. Roosevelt’s, he was striving for different ends. In terms of foreign affairs, Wilson 
was a “missionary of democracy.”44 He broke with his predecessors who only promoted activism 
in the Western Hemisphere for reasons based in nationalism and economic materialism. This 
position was a move away from T. Roosevelt’s “realism,” Taft’s “Dollar Diplomacy,” and 
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American tradition.45 Instead, Wilson’s view was more idealistic and based in his belief that the 
United States should promote peace and democratic ideals abroad. He was not attempting to 
merely advance U.S. interests with the League of Nations. Wilson was attempting to completely 
redefine the role of the U.S. in the world, based on self-determination, democracy, and the need 
for U.S. leadership. These ideals are what ultimately drove Wilson’s attempted reconstruction 
and outlasted any immediate failures he may have had. 
REPUDIATION AND “NORMALCY”: ELECTION OF 1920 
 The election of 1920 cast Warren G. Harding as the repudiator and James M. Cox as the 
faithful son. Cox fulfilled his role as the faithful son and experienced the pitfalls of making the 
politics of articulation. While Cox struggled to campaign on a platform favoring the League of 
Nations when government opposition was high, he ended up betraying Wilson. On the other 
hand, Harding ran on the promise of a “return to normalcy,” centering his entire campaign on 
repudiating not only Wilson, but the entire Progressive Era. Just as the Progressive Era was a 
break from the Gilded Age of “forgotten Presidents,” the Post-War period was a rejection of the 
era before it. For Harding, this election was a final effort to attempt to rejuvenate his decaying 
party by reaffirming the policies of the old Republican regime. This makes Harding in part a 
disjunction president, as he was trying to revive a dying regime, but still partly a weak effort at a 
reconstruction as he directly repudiated Wilson’s regime. For Cox, it was an attempt to continue 
the commitments of his coalition in light of the decay of progressivism and failure of the Treaty 
of Versailles. 
 The Democratic candidate, James M. Cox, was a known reformer and was a supporter of 
Wilson’s internationalism and Progressive reform as the Governor of Ohio. His nomination 
represents an effort to choose a successor open to continuing Wilson’s policies, as opposed to 
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challenging them. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who served as Secretary of the Navy under 
Wilson, was chosen as the Democratic candidate for Vice President in 1920 because of his 
affiliation with Wilson. By selecting someone from the “Wilson wing of the party,” the 
Democrats hoped to appease his constituency, considering Cox was not directly from Wilson’s 
administration.46 Reflecting on his campaign later, Cox wrote, “I came to realize that the banner 
of Woodrow Wilson had really been put in my hands. I resolved to carry on with such strength of 
mind and body as I possessed.”47 As the Democratic candidate, Cox felt obligated to base his 
campaign upon continuing Wilson’s legacy. Wilson had succeeded in reorganizing his party and 
setting his successors on the path of Progressivism and continuing his fight for the League of 
Nations. 
 With the conclusion of WWI and the failure of the Treaty of Versailles still fresh in the 
minds of the American public, the election of 1920 inevitably centered on foreign affairs. During 
the campaign, Cox and FDR paid Wilson a visit at the White House on July 18, 1920. Cox said 
to Wilson, “Mr. President, we are going to be a million percent with you, and your 
Administration, and that means the League of Nations.” Cox was assuring Wilson that he was 
aware of his obligations as the faithful son. FDR, in his vice presidential nomination acceptance 
speech, echoed this sentiment and highlighted the fact that there was unfinished business to 
attend to. He remarked, “Even if a nation entered the war for an ideal, so it has emerged from the 
war with the determination that this ideal shall not die . . . The other half is not won yet.”48 FDR 
was channeling Wilson with his rhetoric about the U.S., the world, and the League of Nations. 
Just as Cox had at his meeting with Wilson, FDR was acknowledging that it was their obligation 
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to settle unfinished business concerning the League of Nations. It was their responsibility to 
continue the commitments of Wilson, the Democratic Party, and ultimately, Americans. 
 Unfortunately, true to the politics of articulation, as the faithful son attempts to continue 
the legacy of his predecessor while simultaneously adapting to changing circumstances, someone 
ended up betrayed. In his nomination acceptance, Cox said this about the Democratic position on 
the League of Nations:  
 As the Democratic candidate, I favor going in . . . ‘We advocate immediate ratification of 
 the Treaty without reservations which would impair its central integrity, but do not 
 oppose the acceptance of any reservation making clearer or more specific the obligations 
 of the United States to the League associates.’49  
 
Cox was linking the issue of joining the League of Nations to the established commitments of his 
party coalition as set forth by Wilson. However, as in the politics of articulation, Cox the 
orthodox-innovator was attempting to update his party’s position to reflect new political 
circumstances. In this case, Wilson was the one being betrayed when the Democratic Party 
platform acknowledged a willingness to accept reservations on the Treaty. While this may have 
been a better political strategy, it betrayed Wilson’s commitment to the Treaty and League as he 
envisioned them. Nonetheless, Cox and FDR had to continue to promote the League of Nations 
in light of growing opposition. 
 The Republican ticket was Warren G. Harding, Senator of Ohio, and Calvin Coolidge, 
the Governor of Massachusetts. They were nominated by the Republican faction desiring to 
reverse the tide of Progressivism. Harding based his campaign on a “return to normalcy,” 
directly repudiating Wilson’s entire administration and characterizing him as abnormal. His 
platform rested heavily on the re-affirmation of old traditional conservative values, as he 
declared in his inaugural address, “Our supreme task is the resumption of our onward, normal 
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way. Reconstruction, readjustment, restoration, all these must follow . . . A regret for the 
mistakes of yesterday must not, however, blind us to the tasks of today.”50 Here Harding was 
suggesting that Wilson was an interruption in the natural cycle of the presidency. Harding was 
resuming this cycle of Republican leadership, beginning with his reconstruction. He clearly saw 
himself as a part of the larger Republican objective, yet primarily within the context of 
repudiating the entire Progressive Era. Wilson was simply an anomaly, a distraction, and a pause 
from business as usual. 
 In addition to order-affirmation, Harding emphasized shattering the notions of 
Progressivism seen in the past few presidencies. Harding viewed Progressivism as a deviation 
from the true purposes of government that should never be utilized again. Instead of creating 
something new, Harding wanted to return to the policies of the past. Harding aimed to decrease 
government intervention in the economy and limit the use of presidential power. He remarked, 
“There is no instant step from disorder to order . . . No altered system will work a miracle . . . 
Any wild experiment will only add to the confusion. Our best assurance lies in efficient 
administration of our proven system.”51 Harding did not want to continue expanding the role of 
government, an experiment he saw as a failure. That is why the U.S. should return to a system 
that had been tried, and in Harding’s point of view, provided the best solution for the country. 
This platform was a direct repudiation of the Progressive politicians, who believed that their 
policies were the fix for America’s poor state after the Gilded Age. 
 More specifically, just as Cox affirmed America’s participation in the League of Nations, 
Harding directed his order-shattering impulses towards reversing the new strain of 
interventionism. Instead, he affirmed the traditional stance on foreign policy in order to justify 
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his repudiation. He observed, “Today our foundations of political and social belief stand 
unshaken . . . The recorded progress of our Republic . . . proves the wisdom of the inherited 
policy of non-involvement in Old-World affairs.”52Harding wanted to return to a less aggressive 
foreign policy with less involvement and no involvement in European affairs. Adhering to this 
policy was the way to ensure that Wilson’s reconstruction was a failure and that the U.S. 
resumed isolationism. 
 However, the Republican Party was still heavily divided on this issue, and not every 
Republican was prepared to abandon Progressive foreign policy. Harding had the task of 
appealing to a pro-league constituency, including former President Taft. Herbert Hoover was 
another example of such a Republican. He wrote, “I had all my adult life been a registered 
Republican and taken part in Republican organizations. [From 1914 to 1920] I engaged in no 
political party activities. After that time I resumed my party affiliations and directed them to 
support the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles.”53 This dedication to Wilson’s foreign policy 
was evidence that Wilson’s crusade did not fall upon deaf ears. With the fractured state of the 
Republican Party, Harding had to appear like a better Pro-League candidate than Cox to ensure 
his victory.54  
 Cox attempted to distance himself from Harding and the Republicans by emphasizing the 
backward-looking nature of their platform. He said, “The leaders opposed to Democracy promise 
to put the country ‘back to normal.’ This can only mean the so-called normal of former 
reactionary administrations. . . Our view is toward the sunrise of tomorrow with its progress and 
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its eternal promise of better things.”55 Cox was reminding the public that the politics of the 
Gilded Age were not as successful as Harding was claiming. Harding wanted to return to the 
very policies that created the America the Progressive Era was attempting to repudiate and fix. 
Cox’s strategy proved futile, as the end of Wilson’s presidency left the direction of the 
Progressive movement unclear. The commitments of the Progressive movement moving forward 
into the 1920’s were unclear, and Harding benefitted from this fragmentation and lack of 
vision.56 
 Harding ended up crushing Cox with 76.1% of the electoral vote and 60.3% of the 
popular vote.57 As far as Congress, the House increased its Republican majority by 123 seats, 
and the Senate by 10.5859 On his quest for normalcy, Harding was attempting to reconstruct the 
Republican Party to reflect the age of laissez-faire, non-interventionism, and reactionary 
government. Unfortunately for Harding, the era he was attempting to return to no longer existed. 
As historian Leonard Schulp argues, “Harding’s promise of ‘normalcy’ reflected a yearning for a 
simpler time in America and a return to less adventurous attitudes . . . Americans voted for 
nostalgia.”60 Wilson and the rest of the Progressive presidents had forever redefined what the 
Presidency was. The emergent pattern of expanding presidential authority, new responsibilities 
abroad, and more power to the President could not be reversed. The political situation changed, 
and being at the end of his recurrent cycle of his party regime, Harding in part faced the perils of 
the impossible leadership situation of disjunction and his reconstruction did not have a chance. 
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 Cox and FDR’s commitment to standing by Wilson demonstrates that Wilson succeeded 
in a reconstruction of his party around Progressive and internationalist ideals. He succeeded in 
establishing a coalition, even if it was weak in 1920, which desired to continue on his work and 
honor his legacy. After the loss in 1920, the Democratic Party was considerably weakened. 
However, the Republican Party of Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover was nowhere near as strong as 
the Republican Party of McKinley, T. Roosevelt, and Taft. Wilson’s presidency successfully 
weakened the Republican Party by presenting a powerful Democratic leadership to counter 
previous Republican dominance. Wilson may have not succeeded in a liberal reconstruction 
between 1913 and 1921, but he did succeed in weakening the Republican Party further and 
indoctrinating his Democratic successors with his ideology. 
WILSON’S LEGACY AND LONG-TERM SIGNIFICANCE 
 Wilson left the Presidency in 1921 a broken man both physically and emotionally. With 
the failure of his vision for the League of Nations, Wilson was unable to execute what would 
have been his crowning achievement. Furthermore, he was losing the White House to a man who 
had won on repudiating his policies and promising to reverse everything Wilson’s presidency 
had accomplished. Despite this, Wilson’s reconstruction was not a failure. While he may have 
not established the Democratic Party as the dominant regime, it is his long term effects that 
deserve the attention. By discussing two future presidents, Herbert Hoover and Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt, the significance of Wilson’s legacy becomes clear. 
 Evidence of Wilson’s long term effects appears in the form of Herbert Hoover. From his 
time in Wilson’s war cabinet as the head of the U.S. Food Administration, Hoover became a 
dedicated pupil of Wilson, despite his Republican affiliation. The impression Hoover leaves in 
his book The Ordeal of Woodrow Wilson is that he seemed to really admire Wilson, not only as 
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an idealist, but as a leader. He often wrote of Wilson as a crusader who fought for his ideals and 
refused to back down due to the importance of what he was fighting for. Despite any immediate 
failures, Hoover still believed Wilson’s legacy was the combinations of the ideals he promoted, 
his revolutionary vision, and his undying devotion to the cause of peace. He also saw the United 
Nations as a revival of the Wilsonian spirit, which in Hoover’s opinion, was the most 
revolutionary aspect of Wilson of them all. Hoover wrote: 
        In spite of failure and tragedy which was to come, it should be recorded here that 
 Woodrow Wilson made great gains for mankind, and the influence of his ideals has 
 extended over these many years. 
        Through his leadership and his sacrifices, he established for the first time in history a 
 systemic and powerful organization of nations to maintain peace . . . 
        Under Mr. Wilson’s banner of freedom, twenty-one races of men threw off their 
 oppression by revolution. . . . There can be no doubt that his prior declaration of New 
 World ideals had been a vital stimulant to these peoples to declare their freedom from 
 oppression. History should record the role of his great proclamations in the quest for 
 freedom . . . 
        But an enumeration of the ‘points’ which the President lost at Paris is of little 
 importance to history except as a demonstration of the hostility of Old World concepts to 
 New World ideals. What needs to be recorded are the lasting up-surging toward freedom 
 and the world organization for enduring peace which Woodrow Wilson brought to a 
 distraught world.61 
 
Hoover saw Wilson’s long-term idealism as his greatest achievement. Through his crusade, 
Wilson may have not secured the League of Nations, but he did indoctrinate the U.S. and the 
world with his new ideals. Furthermore, Wilson repositioned the President as a world leader 
committed to spreading American ideals to other nations of the world. 
 Hoover understood and fought for this as well and was arguing that any immediate 
failures were of little significance when compared to what Wilson’s legacy did for the world. 
However, Hoover was handed the impossible leadership situation almost immediately upon 
entering office, as he was stuck with handling the Great Depression while making the politics of 
disjunction. As a result, it is unknown whether he would have continued Wilson’s policies or 
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have stuck by the commitments of his party coalition. But the fact remains that Wilson’s 
ideology transcended party lines and influenced future leaders of even the Republican Party. 
 Wilson’s influence is really seen in another future president and his true Democratic 
successor, Franklin Delano Roosevelt. FDR first met Wilson sometime between 1911 and 1912 
when he was a New York Senator, Wilson was the Governor of New Jersey, and both men were 
leaders of the emerging Progressive movement. While little is known about their meeting, 
Wilson must have left some sort of impression on FDR, as during his election in 1912, FDR tried 
to gain support for Wilson and even created a New York delegation for the 1912 convention.62 
Throughout Wilson’s presidency and after, FDR continued to promote Progressivism in the 
Democratic Party. After the loss in the election of 1920, FDR wrote, “The fact that our fight this 
year was conducted on high principles . . . makes me feel certain that it will bear fruit in the long 
run. It is of particular importance that we should keep the fight going.”63 As far back as 1920, 
FDR was already dedicated to the commitments of Woodrow Wilson, and this statement 
illustrates his desire to continue to campaign for Progressive ideals and the Democratic coalition 
Wilson had established. All FDR needed was a new opportunity to revive Wilson’s ideals, and 
FDR would be the one to succeed in carrying out those visions. 
 FDR would have his chance to continue fighting for Wilson’s principles upon his own 
election to the Presidency in 1932. FDR’s presidency paralleled Wilson’s in its division between 
domestic, economic concerns and later the crisis of World War II. Domestically, FDR saw much 
legislative success, as Wilson did, and was able to call upon precedent of Democratic 
intervention in the economy. Because of Wilson, scholar Robert Alexander Kraig observes, 
“Democrats became the party of reform in the twentieth century . . . the three great liberal reform 
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administrations of the century (Wilson, FDR, and Lyndon Johnson) . . . [had] to adopt their own 
modernized versions of Wilson’s evasive defense of government.”64 Together, Wilson’s New 
Freedom and T. Roosevelt’s New Nationalism laid the foundation for mass legislative programs 
pushed through the economy, heavy government regulation, and an increase in the power of the 
presidency. In other words, Wilson’s domestic policy was the precursor to FDR’s New Deal and 
the birth of the modern welfare state. 
 Furthermore, Wilson’s influence on the future course of action in the presidency is seen 
most clearly in FDR’s involvement in World War II. FDR, like Wilson, attempted to maintain 
neutrality but was eventually forced into declaring war and entering a European conflict. Once 
again, this intervention was tied to a higher purpose, as FDR channeled Wilsonian ideals about 
America’s role in the world. He declared in his message to Congress, “I assert that we will not 
only defend ourselves to the uttermost but will make it very certain that this form of treachery 
shall never again endanger us.”65 Here, even in his declaration of war, FDR was echoing 
Wilson’s rhetoric and notion of purpose. He was tying the U.S. involvement in the war to the 
greater cause of ending all wars. Only unlike Wilson, FDR now had the precedent to call upon 
and the benefit of his position in the recurrent pattern after the decay of the Republican Party. 
Finally, FDR succeeded in completing Wilson’s vision with the creation of a national peace-
keeping organization founded on cooperation, the United Nations. This time, FDR succeeded 
where Wilson failed because he had the precedent and historical tradition to point to. Ultimately, 
Wilson set the groundwork for FDR’s later reconstruction, transformation of the Democratic 
Party, and redefinition of the presidency as a whole. 
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 The presidencies of Herbert Hoover and FDR demonstrate Wilson’s continuing 
significance even after the end of his presidency and death in 1924. Hoover represents the effect 
that Wilson had over the presidency as a whole. His impact was not limited to Democrats alone, 
as he also succeeded in indoctrinating a future generation of politicians with his ideals, 
Republicans included. FDR, as Wilson’s direct Democratic successor, inherited his legacy. 
Wilson, through his New Freedom legislation and foreign interventionism set up FDR and the 
Democratic Party for their future reconstruction. And as Hoover noted, the impacts of Wilson’s 
crusade internationally cannot be quantified. So while many have deemed his reconstruction a 
failure, this overlooks the long-lasting significance of Wilson’s presidency for future presidents 
and the Democratic Party. 
CONCLUSION 
 As Wilson’s presidency illustrates, Skowronek’s typology in The Politics Presidents 
Make is poor in its handling of the preemptive presidents. Due to his strict, shallow division of 
political history into party regimes, he misses connections between presidents of opposing 
parties in the same era, as well as the importance of brief movements or eras defined by other 
means, such as the Gilded Age or Progressive Era. By only emphasizing short term effects of all 
Presidents except the reconstructive, he misses the greater significance of other presidents on 
their successors. By leaving out discussion of the preemptive presidents in his larger analysis of 
the recurrent pattern of presidential history, he isolates and removes these presidents from their 
rightful places in political time and thus deems their contributions insignificant or 
inconsequential. Lastly, by not dividing up his analysis between domestic and foreign policies, 
he misses the possibility that one president could occupy more than one place in political time. 
So while Skowronek’s analysis of the reconstruction, articulation, and disjunction presidents is 
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for the most part cohesive and in depth, his treatment of the preemptives leaves a lot to be 
desired. 
 Skowronek’s definition of party regimes, as well as his other weaknesses, limited his 
ability to place the preemptive presidents in the recurrent pattern of presidential leadership with 
the other three groups of his typology. To counter this, Skowronek had no choice but to deem 
them the “wild cards” of the presidency, and portray their presidencies as “third way” 
alternatives.66 All of these factors make preemptives seem as though they are almost irrelevant in 
the scope of political time. In actuality, as Wilson’s case demonstrates, these presidents have 
pivotal long term effects for their party, the opposing party, and the institution of the presidency. 
Skowronek’s framework has no place for Woodrow Wilson, who occupied more than one place 
in political time, had to redefine his party in the context of the emergent pattern of the 
Progressive Era, and whose long-term significance transcends both his immediate failures and 
situation as an president opposed to a resilient regime. Wilson, as well as those other presidents 
characterized to be preemptives, does not fit in their box of Skowronek’s typology. Simply put, 
the preemptive presidents as characterized by Skowronek’s framework and typology do not 
exist. 
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